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) 
[Crim. No. 7466. In Bank. June 29, 1965.J 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL 
ALLEN ROBERTS, Defendant and Appellant. 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MAE BLANCHE 
COLEMAN, Defendant and Respondent. 
[Consolidated Appeals.] 
[la, Ib] Criminal Law-New Trial-Determination.-The trial 
court did not err in granting defendant's motion for a new 
trial where incriminating statements were elicited from her 
and from her codefendant by officers, after an investigation for 
murder focused on defendants who were in police custody, 
through interrogations that lent themselves to eliciting in-
criminating statements, which were used at the trial. 
[2] Id.-Appeal-Reserving Questions-Evidence--Admissions.-
Defendants' failure to object to the admission of their state-
ments obtained without advising them of their rights to coun-
sel and to remain silent does not preclude their raising the 
question on appeal where their case was tried before the de-
cisions were rendered establishing that such statements are 
inadmissible. 
[3] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel: Waiver.-The right 
to counsel during interrogation does not turn on a request, 
and a waiver of that right and of the right to remain silent 
cannot be presumed. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 146 et seq., 165; Am.Jur., 
Criminal Law (1st ed §§ 167 et seq., 173). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 969; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 1080(2); [3] Criminal Law, §§ 107,110; (4) Criminal Law, 
§ 448; [5] Criminal Law, §§ 628(1), 852; [6] Criminal Law, 
§ 1404(17). 
*Retired Associate JusticE' of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
) 
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[4] Id.-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Officers.-Before 
introducing statements of defendant mode to investigating 
officers, the prosecution has the burden of showing that de-
fendant, before making the statements, was either informed 
of his rights to counEel and to I'email! l'i1pnt or otherwise 
waived them. 
{5] Id.-Conduct of Counsel-Comment on Failure of Defenda.nt 
to Testify: Instructions-Failure of Defendant to Testify.-
A comment in the prosecutor's argument or the court's instruc-
tions on defendant's failure to testify violates U.S. Const .• 
5th Amend., as made applicahle to the states by the 14th 
Amend. 
[6] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Misconduct of Prosecutor-
Comment on Failure of Defendant to Testify.-The probability 
of a result more favorable to defendant required rever~al for 
the prosecutor's comment on defendants' failure to testify anrl 
the erroneom; introduction of their statements where, except 
for defendants' admissions to 0 witness who had 0 motive to 
direct suspicion away from himself, tht' evidence was almost 
wholly circumstantial and the prosecutor repeatedly stressed 
defendant's lies as evidence of his consciousness of guilt that 
destroyed any innocent interpretation that lIlight ue placed 011 
other evidence. 
APPEALS (one automatically taken uuder Pen. Code, 
§ 1239, subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
H,e City and County of San Francisco and from an order 
granting a new trial. Norman Elkington, Judge. Judgment 
reversed; order affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first 
degree murder imposing the death penalty reversed. 
Nancy A. Rossi, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, 
Albert W. Harris, Jr., and Edward P. 0 'Brien, DE'puty At-
torneys Geniral, for Plaintiff and Appellant and Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
[5] Comment by court suggesting that jury may take into COIl-
sideration failure of accused person to testify, note, 94 A.L.R. 701; 
constitutional or statutory provision permitting comment on failure 
. of accused to testify on his own behalf as violotion of constitutional 
. privilege against self-incrimination, nott', 104 A.L.R. 478. See olso 
Oal.Jur.2d, Trial, §§ 436, 483; Am.Jur., Triol (1st ed §§ 470, 694) . 
.-.. -. - . ... - . .... ,-- , . 
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John A.. Ertola, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C.J.-A jury found the defendants guilty of 
first degree murder and fixed the penalty at death for Daniel 
Allen Roberts and life imprisonment for Mae Blanche Cole-
man. The trial court denied Roberts' motion for new trial 
but granted Mrs. Coleman's motion on the ground that invol-
untary statements were admitted in evidence against her. 
The People's appeal from the order granting Mrs. Coleman 
a new trial has been consolidated with Roberts' automatic 
appeal. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
Mr. and Mrs. Luther Popejoy managed the apartment house 
in which they lived in San Francisco. At approximately 10 
p.m. on June 20, 1962, Popejoy left the building to go to his 
job at a steel plant. When he returned the next morning he 
found his wife dead under a bed in their bedroom. She had 
been strangled, possibly with an electrical extension cord, 
after having suffered a blow on the nose. The time of death 
was sometime between 10 :30 p.m. on June 20, when she was 
last seen alive, and 2 :30 the following morning. There was 
testimony that it would have required considerable strength 
for one person to place the body under the bed. A man's 
watch, the victim's purse, a pair of red shoes with small 
steel heels, the rental agreements between the Popejoys and 
their tenants, and a rent receipt book were missing. There 
was no evidence that the apartment had been entered forcibly. 
Defendants had lived in the apartment house as man and 
wife for several months. Popejoy testified that on his way to 
work on the night of the killing he saw them sitting on the 
front steps of the building. Another tenant testified that he 
met defendant Roberts in the cellar of the building at approxi-
mately 10 :30 p.m. that night. Roberts offered him several 
dozen books of matches, which he was throwing away because 
he was "cleaning up." Roberts and the witness walked out 
of the cellar together and separated in front of the victim's 
door when Roberts said he intended to pay his rent. As the 
witness walked upstairs Roberts knocked on the door. The 
victim called, "'VIlat do you want at this time of nighU" 
and Roberts said that he wished to pay the rent. The witness 
saw the victim open her door and Roberts enter the apart-
ment. 
The police found Roberts' palmprint on the arm of a chair 
in the Popejoy apartment and his fingerprint near the bot-
tom of the door between the living room and bedroom. In 
) 
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the defendants' apartment the police found a radio, two 
pairs of men's pants, and a note addressed to Roberts signed 
by Mrs. Coleman stating that she planned to leave him to go 
to Santa Barbara because he was being unfaithful to her. 
The card on the defendants' mailbox near the front door of 
the building with Roberts' name on it was missing. 
Charles Roberts, defendant Roberts' brother, was the chief 
prosecution witness. He testified that he visited the defend-
ants on June 20 at approximately 6 p.m. Defendant Roberts 
said that he planned to hold up a garment factory at 10 p.m. 
that evening. Charles agreed to take some of defendants' 
clothing to his home, and he left with the clothes by a side 
door at Roberts' direction to avoid being seen by the Pope-
joys. Charles next saw the defendants when they arrived 
at his home at approximately 2 :30 a.m. on June 21. Roberts 
then told Charles, "I think I hit her too hard," and in re-
sponse to Charles' question, "hit who too hard Y" Roberts 
answered, "my landlady." Roberts said that his landlady 
was under or by the bed. Mrs. Coleman was not present 
during this conversation. Charles agreed to drive the defend-
ants to Sacramento. On the way Mrs. Coleman said that she 
had searched the Popejoy apartment and indicated that she 
had been present when Roberts killed the victim. Mrs. Cole-
man said she thought it would be best if the victim were 
dead so that they could not be identified. When they arrived 
in Sacramento Roberts had Charles pawn a watch that was 
identified at the trial as the one taken from the Popejoy 
apartment. They then went to the American River and threw 
in an electrical cord and a blue purse, ,vhich Roberts indi-
cated- had come from the Popejoy apartment. Mrs. Coleman 
told Charles that she had left a note in their apartment 
designed to mislead the police. 
Charles' wife testified that the defendants' clothes were 
in Charles' automobile on the evening of June 20, that when 
the defendants arrived at her apartment after midnight that 
night Mrs. Coleman gave her a pair of black shoes with laces 
and large wedge heels, and that the defendants left with 
Charles. When Charles returned the following day he showed 
her a newspaper story about the killing. He also disposed 
of the shoes Mrs. Coleman had given her. 
In early October 1962 an inspector from the San Francisco 
Police Department and a San Francisco Assistant District 
Attorney, armed with warrants for the defendants' arrest 
for murder, went to Oregon where defendants were being held 
) 
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on another criminal charge. By that time the police had 
gathered most of the evidence recited above. The investigators 
questioned both defendants, and parts of tape recordings of 
the interrogations were played for the jury. 
Roberts told the investigators that he and Mrs. Coleman 
left the Popejoy apartment house sometime around the middle 
of June at approximately midnigllt or 1 a.m. They did not 
tell Mr. or Mrs. Popejoy that they were leaving. They left 
because Roberts had no job and had only $17. They hitchhiked 
to Marysville and then to Oroville, where they caught a freight 
train to Oregon. Roberts stated that he had not seen Mrs. 
Popejoy on the day he left San Francisco but that he saw 
Mr. Popejoy at about 9 p.m. when he and Mrs. Coleman 
were sitting on the outside steps and Mr. Popejoy left to go 
to work. He had not been in the Popejoys' apartment on 
that day and had not been in it since the last time he paid 
the rent, which he always paid in the daytime and never 
at night. He had never attempted to pay the rent at night 
and had never been anywhere near the Popejoy door after 
Mr. Popejoy had gone to work. He had only been inside the 
Popejoy apartment at the desk and had never at any time 
been in the bedroom. 
In a separate interview, Mrs. Coleman first told the inves-
tigators that she had been living with Roberts for about three 
months at the Popejoy apartment house before they left 
San Francisco sometime after June 25. They left at about 
3 :30 or 4 a.m., hitchhiked to Marysville, and then took a 
freight train to Oregon. They left because Roberts had vio-
lated his parole and they had seen his parole officer· in San 
Francisco. She had not been in the Popejoy apartment the 
evening before they left. After they saw Mr. Popejoy on 
his way to work, they went to their apartment where they 
remained until 2 or 3 a.m. when they left San Francisco. 
When the investigators told Mrs. Coleman that they had 
talked to Roberts' brother Charles and knew how she and 
Roberts left San Francisco, she admitted that she and Roberts 
llad gone to Charles' apartment at about 3 or 4 a.m. and 
asked him for a ride to Sacramento. In the morning Charles 
pawned It guitar and Roberts pawned his watch. She did not 
see Mrs. Popejoy the evening before and neither she nor 
Roberts attempted to pay. the rent that night. She admitted 
writing the note left in the kitchen but claimed that she 
wrote it to make Roberts leave San Francisco. She wrote 
it about 2 a.m. when Roberts was in the Fillmore district for 
about two hours. When asked if she had ever seen a pair of 
) 
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Mrs. Popejoy's shoes, she said that Mrs. Popejoy had given 
her a pair of black shoes but that she could not remember 
what she had done with them. 
Neither defendant testified at the trial. 
Because of the introduction into evidence of defendants' 
statements and comment by the court and prosecutor on 
defendants' failure to testify, we requested briefs directed 
to the question whether the recent decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [84 
S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653], and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], were applicable 
to this case. In the Escobedo case it was held that "where 
... [a crim.inal] investigation is no longer a general inquiry 
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular 
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody. the 
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself 
to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has re-
quested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his 
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his 
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused 
has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory 
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 342 [372 U.S. 335 (83 S.Ct. 792, 
9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733)], and that no statement 
elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used 
against him at a criminal trial." (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478, 490491 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977].) 
[la] Conceding that the investigation into Mrs. Popejoy's 
murder had focused on defendants, that they were in police 
custody, that the interrogations by the investigators lent 
themselves to eliciting incriminating statements, and that 
incriminating statements were elicited and used against them 
at the trial, the Attorney General contends that the Esco-
bedo case is not controlling because there was no objection 
to the introduction of the statements into evidence and there 
is no showing that defendants were not advised of their right 
to remain silent and no showing that either of them requested 
and was denied the assistance of counsel. 
[2] Since this case was tried before the Escobedo de-
cision, defendants' failure to object to the admission of their 
statements into evidence does not preclude their raising the 
question Oll appeal. (Pl'ople v. Hillery, 62 C'a1.2d 6!l2. 711 
[44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382], and cases cited.) [3] The 
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right to counsel during interrogation does not turn on a 
request (People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338, 347 [42 Cal.Rptr. 
169, 398 P.2d 361]), and a waiver of that right and of the 
right to remain silent cannot be presumed. [4] The burden 
is therefore on the prosecution to show that a defendant was 
either informed of these rights or otherwise waived them.1 
(People v. Stewart, 62 Ca1.2d 571, 580-581 [43 Cal.Rptr. 
201, 400 P.2d 97]; People v. Hillery, 62 Ca1.2d 692, 
711-712 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382]; People Y. LiZ-
liock, 62 Ca1.2d 618, 621 [43 CaLRptr. 699, 401 P.2d 
4].) [ib] Accordingly, whether or not the trial court 
erred in holding that Mrs. Coleman's statements were invol-
untary, it did not err in granting her motion for a new trial. 
Since Roberts did not confess to the investigators but only 
made false exculpatory statements and since the jury was 
instructed that Mrs. Coleman's statements should be con-
sidered only against her, it is contended that the error in 
admitting their statements into evidence was not prejudicial 
to Roberts. (See People v. Parham, 60 CaL2d 378, 385-386 
[33 Cal.Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001] ; cf. People v. Dorado, 62 
Ca1.2d 338, 356-357 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169,398 P.2d 361].) This 
error cannot be considered alone, however, for the court and 
prosecutor also erred in commenting on defendants' failure 
to testify. [5] It is now settled that such comment violates 
the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
(Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 
L.Ed.2d 106] ; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [84 S.Ct. 
1758.12 L.Ed.2d 653).) 
[6] Except for Charles' testimony of defendants' oral 
admissions to him, the evidence was almost wholly circum-
stantiaL It was the defense theory that the circumstances 
were consistent with innocence, or at most second degree 
murder, and that as a possible participant in the crime, 
Charles ""as unworthy of belief. Charles was familiar with 
the Popejoy apartment house, said he was there on the eve-
ning of June 20, and knew that defendants were planning 
IThe record affirmatively shows that defendant Roberts requested 
counsel and did not wuh'e his rights. The tape recording of his inter-
view with the investigators began before they introduced themselves to 
him and cQntinued until the enel. of tIle questioning. At no time did they 
inform Roberts of his rights. ~Ioreover. he repeatedly stated to the in-
vestigators that he wished to answer questions only in the presence of an 
attorney. Despite these protests. the investigators persisted in questioning 
him and succeeded in eliciting statements that were used against him at 
the trial. 
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to leave town. He pawned Mr. Popejoy's watch and threw 
the other things allegedly taken from the apartment into the 
river. He at first denied any knowledge of the crime, and 
only implicated defendants after the police learned that he 
had pawned the watch. Thus, Charles had an obvious in-
terest in directing suspicion away from himself. Roberts' 
entry into Mrs. Popejoy's apartment in full view of another 
tenant was not consistent with a preexisting plan to rob or 
kill, and the jury might well have entertained at least a rea-
sonable doubt whether Roberts was guilty of first degree 
murder had the prosecution not been allowed to prove that 
both he and Mrs. Coleman lied to the police and had the 
court and prosecutor not commented on their failure to testify. 
In his argument to the jury the prosecutor repeatedly 
stressed defendants' lies2 as evidence of consciousness of 
guilt that destroyed any innocent interpretation that might 
be placed upon the other evidence, and he asserted that the 
lies were part of a prearranged plan of Roberts and Mrs. 
Coleman to mislead the police. 
Moreover, the inadmissible statements were not merely repe-
titions of similar admissible statements. Accordingly, it can-
not be determined what impact their erroneous admission 
may have had on Roberts' decision not to testify. The prose-
2For example: "Well, we know that ultimately both of these de-
fendants were captured in Oregon. We know that, don't we' And at 
that time the frame of mind of Daniel Roberts, I suppose, should 
have been, 'Well, I am caught. My parole has been violated. O.K. I 
give up now. That is it.' 
"And if you asked him then ... 'Well, how did you get away 
that night,' he could have said easily, 'Well, I went out to Charles 
and he drove me to Sacramento.' Or he could have said, 'Well, we 
went to Sacramento.' 
" 'Did you go to see Mrs. Popejoy that night!' He could have easily 
said, 'Well, yes, I did. I did, yes.' 
" 'Did you see Charles that nightT' He should have replied, 'Well, 
yes, I saw Charles that night.' 
"Instead. what did he sayi Here is a man that tries to tell you that 
he has nothing to do with this murder, that the only reason that he 
fied was his violation of parole. In effect, he should be in a position 
of saying, 'Well, there is nothing more to lie about now. I am 
caught. My parole has been violated. You have me now. There is 
no reason to lie.' And yet be does. He lies about his prints. He lies 
about going'to Marysville. He lies about seeing Charles that night. 
He lies nbout being ncar her apartment thnt night or going in her 
apartment that night. He lies ahout seeing her thnt night. And the 
question comes into your mind, 'Why" 
"Here is II mlln who hns nothing to rUIl from any mort'. His parole 
is violated. He is captured. And he lies once, twice, three times, and 
lies some more. And the question comes up, 'Well, what is this man 
lying for! Whnt forf What does he know' What is he trying to 
eonceal" " 
) 
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cutor took full advantage of that decision by forcefully com-
menting on it in his argument,3 as he then reasonably assumed 
he was entitled to do. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; People v. 
Adamson,27 Cal.2d 478 [165 P.2d 3] ; Adamson v, California, 
332 U.S. 46 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 
1223],) With evidence before the jury that he had repeatedly 
lied to the police, Roberts and his trial counsel may have 
concluded that it would be futile for Roberts to attempt to 
eXCUlpate himself by testifying to other eXCUlpatory facts 
even if they were true. Had he not been deprived of his right 
to counsel during interrogation, he might have been advised 
to say nothing or to tell the truth if he was innocent or 
guilty of only second degree murder, even though the truth 
might have appeared to him as less exculpatory than false 
3For example: "So they ask you, 'Disbelieve Charles,' they say 
to you, 'Disbelieve him.' They don't take the stand under oath and 
tell you he lied. These are the people who could tell you that he lied, 
if he .did so. They do not do so. They ask you to disbelieve because he 
made some inconsistencies. . , • 
"Shouldn't you say, 'At least, if I am asked as a logical person 
to reject his testimony, I should have liked to have heard the testimony 
of one of those two defendants or both; I should have liked to have at 
least have heard them say one thing, "I didn't kill Mrs. Popejoy." , 
"I should think yoU might want to hear perhaps a little more and 
say something about, 'I didn't throw a cord in thc river.' But, no, you 
are not accorded that privilege, and the defendants need not take the 
stand. I don't mean to conclude, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
for one moment that they need to take the stalid, or that they should, 
or that you should conclude just even for a moment that they are 
guilty by not taking the stand, because, thank God, in America no 
one need get up . • . there and hang himself, and I, for one, believe 
in this law. The prosecutor must prove his case to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and this is good law and this is what I am trying 
to do. I don't think we should have to rely on their testimony to 
convict them, and the law promises this, and I agree to it. 
"But they sit here with so much knowledge within their grasp 
and deny you that; you can conclude that, in fact, Charles Roberts 
and these other witnesses like McKinley Brown, in fact, did tell the 
truth. You can at least logically do this .•.. 
" . • . [Counsel for Roberts) says, after all, he says, my client, 
you know, has been convicted of a felony and if he took the stand, 
you wouldn't believe him anyway, because he would stand impeached. 
"What sort of an explanation is thaH What sort of a substitution 
is that for offering you at least evidence, for having at least this 
much come from the mouth of the defendant • • . Daniel Roberts, 
under oath' 
"One, the motive for Charles to lie; two, to tell you he didn't kill 
:!IIrs. Popejoy, under oath, 'I didn't kill Mrs. Popejoy.' Three, 'I was 
with Dora.' And who is Dora; and how can she be located' If he just 
said this, but he didn't say anything like that. I want to bring it 
very clearly forward to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that 
you are not to imply if a defendant, a man who doesn't take the 
stand, he is guilty. But a man who doesn't take the stand to testify, 
I suppose, to at least this e%tent, does not dispute the facts that have 
been presented by the prosecution. • • ." 
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denials of any incriminating facts. He was induced at a 
critical stage in the proceedings to make choices that he 
could make intelligently only with the advice of counsel. 
(Escobedo v. Illinoig, 378 U.S. 478, 486 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 
L.Ed.2d 977]; see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 
[82 s.et. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114]; White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
59, 60 [83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 hEd.2d 193]; Glasset· v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 60, 7;:5-76 [62 S.Ct. 467, 86 L.Ed. 680]; 
Williams v. Kaiser, 32:3 V.S. 471, 475-476 [65 S.Ct. 363, 
89 L.Ed. 398 J ; cf. People v. Gaines, 58 Ca1.2d 630, 644 [25 
Cal.Rptr. 448, 375 P.2d 296] [dissenting opinion].) 
After reviewing the entire record in the light of all the 
foregoing consideratiolls, we are of the opinion that it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Roberts 
would have been reached had defendants' statements not 
been erroneously admitted into evidence and had the court 
and prosecutor not commented on their failure to testify. Ac-
cordingly, the judgment must be reversed. (See Cal. Const., 
art. VI, § 4%; People v. Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 
P.2d 243]; People v. Bostick, 62 Ca1.2d 820, 823-826 [44 
Cal.Rptr. 649, 402 P.2d '529].) 
The reversal of Roberts' conviction is compelled by the 
Griffin case and by the Escobedo case regardless of whether 
a request for counsel during interrogation is controlling. 
Roberts repeatedly stated to the investigators that he wished 
to answer questions only in the presence of an attorney. De-
spite these protests, the investigators persisted in questioning 
him and succeeded in eliciting statements that were introduced 
into evidence against him. The prosecutor vigorously urged 
in argument that those statements and Roberts' failure to 
testify destroyed his defense. 
The trial court granted Mrs. Coleman's motion for a new 
trial on the ground that her statements were involuntary 
and clearly prejudciaI. Since her statements are also inad-
missible under the rules set forth in the People v. Dorado, 
62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], People v. 
Stewart, 62 Cal.2d 571 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97]. 
People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 
382], anti People v. Lilliock, 62 Ca1.2d 618 [43 Cal.Rptr. 
699, 401 P.2d 4], and since the court and prosecutor 
also erred in commenting on her failure to testify. we need 
not and have not determined whether the trial court correctly 
ruled that her statements were involuntary. The reasons 
!lOd authorities set forth at length after the hearing and re-
/~) 
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hearing in People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 
169, 398 P.2d 361], compelled this court, as they have other 
courts,4 in being faithful to the Constitution of the United 
States as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, 
to hold that the rule of the Escobedo case does not depend 
upon a request for counsel. 
The order granting defendant Coleman a new trial is 
affirmed. The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Dooling, J.,. con-
currl:'d. 
SCHAUER,J.,· Concurring and Dissenting.-In this case 
each defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court denied 
the motion of defendant Roberts but granted that of defendant 
Coleman. 
Because of those attributes of our judicial system which 
are indigenous to the trial process (and which are adumbrated 
in my dissent in People v. Davis (1965) 62 Cal.2d 791, 801-
802 [44 Cal.Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142]) I recognize that the 
trial judge is in a position far superior to a justice of this 
court in resolving factual issues. These issues encompass the 
pivotal one as to the existence or nonexistence of the constitu-
tionally defined basis without which the court is peremptorily 
forbidden to grant a new trial (or, on appeal, to reverse a 
judgment). 
By "constitutionally defined basis" I refer to that articu-
lated by California Constitution, article VI, section 4%,1 in-
terpreted in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836 
[12] [299 P.2d 243]. It is, of course, true that the subject 
section of the Constitution "should control the action of the 
trial court in considering a motion· for a new trial, but when 
the trial court has . . . granted the motion, the sole issue be-
40lifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649, 653; United States ex reI. 
Russo v. New Jersey, 331 F.2d 429; Galarza Oruz v. Delgado, 233 F. 
Supp. 94!; United States ex reI. Rivers v. MyerSj 2!O F.Supp. 39, 43; State v. Dufour, -- R.I. -- [206 A.2d 82, 85 ; State v. Neely. 239 
Ore. 487 [398 P.2d 482]. 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council . 
. 
l"Sec. 4%. No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in 
any case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper 
admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter 
of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after 
an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court 
8hall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice." 
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fore the appellate court is whether the trial court has abused 
its discretion." (Brandclius v. City"" County of San Fran-
cisco (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 729, 744 [18] [306 P.2d 432].) 
I do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the motion of defendant Roberts. Furthermore, as-
suming (only for the purposes of this dissenting and con-
curring opinion) the errors declared by the majority, I am 
not of the view (in the light of the entire record) that a result 
more favorable to defendant Roberts would have been reached 
in the absence of those errors. .Accordingly, I dissent from 
the majority's reversal of, and would affirm, the judgment 
against Roberts. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4Y2; People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818, 835-836 [12] [299 P.2d 243].) 
In respect to defendant Coleman, from my disadvantageous 
position factwise, I cannot validly conclude that the trial 
court as a matter of law abused its discretion in granting her 
motion for a new trial. Accordingly, I concur with the ma-
jority in affirming that order. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the order grant-
ing defendant Coleman a new trial and would affirm the 
judgment of first degree murder fixing the penalty at death as 
to defendant Roberts. . 
After an examination of the record, I am not of the opinion 
that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 
defendants would have been reached in the absence of the 
errors complained of. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4112; see con-
curring and dissenting opinions in In re Shipp, 62 Ca1.2d 
547 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571], People v. Modesto, 62 
Ca1.2d 436, 464 [42 Cal.Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753], and 
People v. Hines, 61 Ca1.2d 164, 175, 183 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 
390 P.2d 398] ; and dissenting opinions in People v. Domdo, 
62 Ca1.2d 338, 361-364 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361].) 
My views 011 the legal principles involved in cases such as 
this are accurately and realistically expressed by l\Ir. J llstice 
Fourt in his dissenting opinion in People v. Benat'idez, 233 
Cal.App.2d 303, 307 et seq. [43 Cal.Rptr. 577], filed on 
March 30, 1965. 
The defendant in that case was Mnvieted in 1959 of first 
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment; his COll-
viction was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, and tllis 
court unanimously denied a hearing. In April 1964. abont a 
year after Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 [83 8.et. 814, 
9 L.Ed.2d 811], was decided, the District Court of Appeal 
was compelled to vacate its judgment because the defendant 
) 
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had not been represented by coullSel on appeal. Counsel was 
then appointed, the appellate court again reviewed the record, 
and affirmed the judgment for the second time . 
.After Escobedo, we granted the defendant's petition for a 
hearing and retransferred the case to the District Court of 
.Appeal for reconsideration in light of that decision. 
Upon reviewing the case for the third time, two members 
of thc three-member District Court of Appeal felt compelled, 
six years after conviction, to reverse on the authority of 
Escobedo and this court's decision in People v. Dorado, 62 
Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], in spite of the 
fact that the dE'fendant had volunt.arily confessed to having 
committed a cold-blooded murder in the perpetration of rob-
bery and had had the advantage of every legal resource. 
'While the long lJistory of review of the Benavidez conviction 
makes a reversal more appalling than in the present case, 
Justice Fourt analyzes the problems faced by law enforcement 
officers when appellate courts, with apparent indi.fference to 
the rights of law-abiding citizens, move the rules of formal 
court procedure back to the police station and reverse con-
victions where there has been no miscarriage of justice. His 
dissent is quoted, in part: 
" ... In effect, a policeman, under the rule set forth [Dorado 
rule J, when he thinks he has a prime suspect in custody must 
proceed to arraign the suspect for further questioning-and if 
the policeman does not so properly arraign the suspect, even 
a full, complete and voluntary confession of the suspect made 
within two minutes thereafter is not admissible at the trial. 
And this is done apparently, (not to protect an innocent per-
son) but to punish the police for a failure to perform their 
duty-but the net result is that a dangerous criminal is turned 
loose onto society and decent people are at the mercy of that 
dangerous criminal until he is caught in some other crime of 
violence. 
"A Pandora's box of confusion, uncertainty, disarray and 
discord is unleashed by such a decree. For example, the law 
books are fun of cases where committing judges, trial judges 
and others llave proceeded in cases with the understanding of 
all concerned that there was. a sufficient, proper and legal 
waiyer of some particular right by a defendant (such as a 
public trial, jury trial, delay in trial, delay in pronouncing 
judlrment, appointment of counsE'l, jury cllallenge, etc.) and 
which later have been reversed by an appellate court because 
some justice thought that the judge of the lower court had mis-
interpreted the evidence of waiver. Can anyone imagine how 
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many criminals in the future will swear (even though an 
officer has fully complied with the law of Dorado) to the effect 
that they did not really understand that they were waiving 
any rights, that they did not hear what the policemen had to 
say, that they were emotionally disturbed at the time and did 
not really mean to waive any rights. Furthermore, it can 
easily be seen in the light of the fact that no workable rule is 
or can be laid down as to what constitutes a proper waiver and 
as a consequence every police officer necessarily will be prac-
tically on his own. In other words, the court says, in effect, I 
that it will nullify the policeman's efforts and the results I 
obtained therefrom if he does not meet the standards of the . 
court, but the court refuses to tell the policeman in advance I 
what the standards are. Could anyone design a better formula 
for handcuffing the police? Query: does the suspect have to 
make a declaration of waiver, or can he impliedly waive Y What 
is the standard a policeman is to use in coming to a conclusion 
as to whether a suspect has intelligently and understandably 
waived his rights to keep still-keeping in mind, of course, 
that the waiver must depend upon the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case, including the background, experi-
ence and conduct of the suspect? 
"Heretofore the courts have thought that 'the serious and 
weighty responsibility' of making a determination as to whether 
there was a waiver of a substantial right was lodged in the 
trial judge. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 [58 S.Ct. 
1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357].) Now, apparently, the 
policeman is supposed to make the determination as to whether 
and when the suspect makes an intelligent and knowledgeable 
waiver. The simple stating of tlle proposition makes it clear 
that the successful interrogation of suspects will be next to 
impossible under any such rule. 
"The Supreme Court of the United States has in the past 
ruled to the effect that there was no constitutional right of a 
suspect to be advised of his right to counselor of his right to 
remain silent. (Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 [83 S.Ct. 
1336, 10 L.Erl.2d 513]; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 
[78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448] ; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 
504 [78 S.Ct. 1297, 2 hEd.2d 1523].) Likewise, our Supreme 
Court has heretofore similarly held in People v. Ditson, 57 
Ca1.2d 415 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165,369 P.2d 714] ; People v. Garner, 
57 Ca1.2d 135 [18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680]; People v. 
Kendrick, 56 Ca1.2d 71 [14 Ca1.Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13] ; and 
People v. Crooker, 47 Ca1.2d 348 [303 P.2d 753] . 
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"Under Dorado policemen who ordinarily are not required 
to be learned and skilled in constitutional law now have the 
burden of advising suspects of their constitutional rights, and 
they must do so at just the right moment in the proceedings, 
otherwise the probabilities are extremely great that a self-
confessed violent criminal will be turned loose. It appears that 
any court, at the very least, should look at the totality of the 
circumstances in the police procedure to determine whether 
there was fundamental fairness; even under those circum-
stances there would be no well-defined guide lines for a police-
man to follow. There should never be a situation, however, 
where a coldblooded, robbing, murderer in the face of a 
mountain of conclusive evidence against him may be released 
into society solely because the police failed to comply with 
a rule which was nonexistent at the time of the investigation 
and the trial-and particularly so where the reversal is not 
upon the theory that possibly the defendant is innocent. 
" A hearing before a judicial officer in a judicial proceeding 
is one thing-a police investigation is something else. The ru1es 
of evidence should, of course, prevail in the judicial proceed-
ing, but certainly not in the police interrogation process. The 
next step might well be to promUlgate a rule to the effect that 
the police cannot consider hearsay evidence in their investiga-
tions. Query: what occurs in the event a suspect asks for a 
named attorney and the police secure that named attorney for 
the defendant and the suspect later claims that the attorney 
was ineffective, and, therefore, was no attorney at aU-is the 
free and voluntary confession of the suspect made after he had 
talked to the named attorney to be admitted or rejected be-
cause counsel was supposedly ineffective? Is there to be a 
presumption that any suspect who confesses after seeing his 
attorney has an ineffective attorney? 
"Assume that a crime has been committed, and the police 
arrest a prime suspect and have him in custody and the sus-
pect wants to talk to his attorney A (who has represented 
him in several other criminal trials) but A is out of the 
country on a vacation at the time and will not be back for 30 
days-->.what do the police do-is the investigation at a stand-
still and stalemate--and if the suspect confesses in the mean-
time and before the attorney returns, is the confession ad-
missible into evidence T 
"The police, as I understand it, are representatives of the 
executive arm of the government-there to enforce the law 
as written, to protect and to serve the community. Why should 
an officer be insulated from talking to a suspect T There seems 
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to be expressed in both Escobedo and Dorado a veiled distrust 
of the police. As heretofore indicated, police are but the 
representatives of the public and the presumption is that they 
perform their duties faithfully and well, and the records bear 
out the fact that they do their jobs extremly well considering 
the judge-made hurdles which have been put into their paths. 
The fact that police work is not performed in public view 
should be of no particular consequence, for by the nature of 
things, it has to be so conducted-the work of the police is to 
ferret out crime and to keep the community a safe place for 
its residents. It may be distasteful to have police at all or 
to have them investigating and questioning-on the other hand, 
it is more distasteful to be unable to walk on an ordinary 
street in a city without fear of violence being committed to 
your person or property. If people committed no crime, there 
would be little need for policemen. But be that as it may, the 
judicial attitude of this state seems entirely unrealistic as to 
conditions as they exist insofar as the police are concerned. 
"In Dorado the court waves aside any forebodings of law 
enforcement officials as to the effect of its ruling. The court 
cites as authority, in part, for its position a statement in an 
article by J. Edgar Hoover in a 1951-1952 Iowa Law Review 
(p. 182) where Hoover said: 
" 'Agents are taught that any suspect or arrested person, 
at the outset of an interview, must be advised that he is not 
required to make a statement and that any statement given 
can be used against him in court. Moreover, the individual 
must be informed that, if he desires, he may obtain the services 
of an attorney of his own choice. Duress or brutality of any 
type is absolutely forbidden. Any Special Agent guilty of 
such conduct is subject to immediate dismissal from the 
service. The highest ethics of law enforcement become part 
of the Special Agent's credo. Nothing less can be accepted.' 
"Hoover also pointed out in that article that the F.B.I. 
is not a police force-it is the investigative arm of the Depart-
ment of Justice, is strictly a fact-finding agency. It does not 
authorize tJr decline prosecution or make recommendations or 
evaluations. 
"In any event, if J. Edgar Hoover is to be used as an author-
ity (and I assuredly believe he should be) then it is appropri-
ate to have something of his of more recent date. In a speech at 
St. Ignatius Loyola University on November 24, 1964, and re-
ported in the Congressional Record February 8, 1965, he said, 
among other things: 
" 'The moment has arrived when we must face realistically 
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the startling fact tbat since 1958 crime in tbis country bas 
increased five times faster than our population growth. Seri-
ous crimes-murder, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, aggra-
vated assault, automobile theft-have mounted steadily since 
the end of World War II. In 1951 these crimes for the first 
time topped tbe 1 million mark, and more than 21,4 million 
serious crimes were reported during 1963. 
" 'Even more ominous is the fact that this terrifying spiral 
in crime bas come about througb a growing wave of youthful 
criminality across tbe Nation. Last year for the 15th consecu-
tive year crimes involving our young people increased over the 
previous year. For all serious crimes committed in the United 
States in 1963, youthful offenders were responsible for a stag-
gering 72 percent of the total arrests for these crimes. 
" 'What a grim and unhappy commentary on the moral 
climate of this great Nation. Tbe moral strength of our Nation 
has decreased alarmingly. . . . 
" 'These shocking statistics together with the public's ap-
parent indifference to them are indicative of the false morality 
we are tolerating today .... 
" 'Law and order are the foundations upon which successful 
government must stand. Without law and order, society will 
d.estroy itself. 
" 'We must never forget that government cannot favor one 
group or one special interest over its duty to protect the rights 
of all citizens. We must constantly guard government against 
the pressure groups wbich would crush the rights of others 
under heel in order to achieve their own ends. 
" 'The law of the land is above any individual. All must 
abide by it. If we short cut the law, we playa dangerous game 
which can only resuZt in totaZ defeat for all of us because if 
we destroy our system of government by law, we destroy our 
only means of achieving a stable society . ... 
" , Justice has nothing to do with expediency. It has nothing 
to do with temporary standards . . . . 
" 'Unfortunately and too often humanity, if left to itself, 
moyes along the line of least resistance. That is the reason wc 
make such slow progress, and why we are prone to wait for 
pathfinders to blaze the way for us to follow. Each of us hopes 
that beyond the despair and darkness of today there is some-
thing better in store for tomorrow. It will be tragic if nothing 
but hope is b·rought to bear on the problem of crime ill the' 
United States today . ... 
" ' ... If we are to reverse the crime picture in this country, 
• ! 
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we must makc a sustained effort to stir the complacent ones 
to awareness. 
" 'lVe mollycoddle young criminals and release unreformed 
hoodlums to prey anew on society. The blceding hcarts, par-
ticularly among the judiciary, m'e so concerned for young 
criminals that they become indifferent to thc rights of law-
abiding citizens. 
" '"\Ve must have judges with courage and a high sense of 
their duty to protect the public and to adequately penalize 
criminals if we are to stop the spread of serious and dangerous 
crimes against society. 
" , We must adopt a most realistic attitude toward this criti-
cal problem. We have tried the lenient approach and it has 
failed.' (Italics added.) 
"Furthermore, if it is to be inferred from Dorado that the 
rule enunciated there works well in the federal system, I can 
only think that the one area where they 11 ave the federal system 
exclusively, namely, Washington, D.C., does not commend 
itself to California. The statistics show, without question, that 
Washington, D.C. has more aggravated assaults than any city 
of corresponding size in. the United States, where armed 
marauders prowl the streets at night, where no sensible woman 
dares walk at nighttime-where an atmospllere of lawlessness 
even pervades the public schools. And a look at the crime 
statistics of this area (California) will indicate that ever since 
the courts apparently have embraced the philosophy of su-
perior rights for inferiors or criminals, the law-abiding public 
has suffered drastically. 
"The rights of those accused of crimes should not be para-
mount and superior to the rights of the decent law-abiding 
citizens of the community. It is to engage in nothing short of 
duplicity to say that the rule of Dorado will not seriously ham-
per effective law enforcement in California-and the penalty 
in effect, as I have heretofore indicated, is visited upon the 
public. 
"The police have the right and duty to conduct reasonable 
interrogations of persons charged with crime-it is a duty they 
will have, regardless of Supreme Court decisions, and it is 
totally unrealistic and manifestly unfair and dangerous to 
expound rules of conduct or procedure to which the police 
cannot possibly strictly adhere while at the same time per-
forming their duties and fulfilling their responsibilities as 
expected of them by the decent people of the community. 
"This business of grasping at anything to support a reversal 
in a criminal case (the search for error) has gotten to the point 
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of absurdity where justice is perverted and respect for the 
administration of justice is nil. 
"If any support is needed for that assertion, I only point 
to the general disrespect for authority and specifically to the 
disrespect for the law enforcement officer who is repeatedly 
assaulted while acting in the line of duty. 
"I refuse to join in what I think is a most unfortunate 
trend of judicial decisions which strain to give the guilty not 
the same but vastly more protection than the law-abiding citi-
zen receives. 
"Furthermore, contrary to the rule of Dorado, the appellate 
courts of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Ohio, Maryland, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New York and New Jersey have held in 
effect that the rule of Escobedo is as the Supreme Court of 
the United States stated it, namely that the refusal of a sus-
pect's reqttest for counsel is an indispensable condition of the 
new constitutional rule. 
"Admittedly, this so-called newly discovered constitutional 
right uncovered in Dorado is something which no other court 
in the past 150 years has ever before found. It seems to me 
that rights which reach constitutional magnitude in 1965 surely 
must have been of some significance or size sometime during 
the last 100 years at least to the extent that one appellate 
court in the land would have observed such a right and so 
declared it. There is no such opinion in the books which I 
ean find. I am unwilling to attribute to all of the appellate 
justices of all of the appellate courts of the United States 
in the past 150 years such blindness. 
"If the thought is that free and voluntary confessions 
should no longer be used or available to the prosecution in the 
trial of cases, it would be far better to so announce in so 
many words and have done with it. The use of confessions 
should not, however, by any whittling down process be put out 
of existence on the installment plan-in other words, the use 
of confessions should not meet the fate the death penalty has 
met. 
"An investigation of criminal activity and the trial of a 
suspect should ee a search for the truth, with all competent and 
relevant evidence admitted before the trier of fact to the end 
that justice might prevail and the public be protected. Noth-
ing could be worse than to have no fixed doctrine in the de-
cisions and no precise guidelines for those whose duty it is to 
enforce the law. 
"It is an old saying that every criminal ought to have his 
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day in court, and he certainly should have it, but it is nothing 
short of ridiculous for the appellant in this case, having had 
his many, many days in court to be turned loose now, not be-
cause there is even a remote possibility of his innocence, but 
to teach the police. a lesson. 
"How refreshing it would seem, and how greatly enhanced 
the respect for the administration of justice, if appellate courts 
would not roam at will in the limitless area of personal beliefs 
and philosophy, but would make their decrees under the plain 
language of the Constitution." 
